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Since 2000, the possibility of extending human lifespan has been a highly debated 
topic by both biomedical scientists (de Grey and Rae, 2007; Olshansky & Carnes, 
2002) and philosophers (Agar, 2010; Overall, 2003). One kind of attempt to find 
middle ground in this debate has been efforts to distinguish two kinds of life 
extension: moderate and radical (Agar, 2013; Glannon 2002; Lucke et al, 2006).  
Although, there are three reasons for rejecting this distinction:  
1. The difference between moderate and radical life extension cannot be 
explained only by a quantitative measurement but also by a qualitative 
distinction. Jeanne Calment's age is not a maximum lifespan (imaginable) and 
I propose the concept of Uncertainty Threshold of Longevity to debate 
whether there is a limit in our species. 
 
2. The question of whether a therapy will be considered in a Weak Sense or in 
a Strong Sense. It still does not exist, save (or with the exception of) caloric 
restriction, many promising researches on aging. How to evaluate whether a 
treatment will add more years or more health or how to know the best way 
to live 200 years? 
 
3. A thought experiment named Peter Pan Drug suggests that a healthspan 
extension, in a radical sense, allows us to re-think about a lifestyle totally 
different from now. Example: a life extended to 120 years but maintaining 
physical and mental condition all the time, is it moderate kind?  
I propose an alternative model for resolving this debate. This model builds upon the 
distinctions that Juengst (et al, 2003) and Wareham (2016) make about different levels 
and means to control human senescence, to propose the following conceptual 
categories:  (a) Compression of Morbidity; (b) Slowed Aging; (c) Negligible Aging or 
SENS; (d) Arrested Aging; (e) Escaping Aging. In addition, I have to add several concepts 
which are relevant for my purpose: indefinite life, virtual sort of immortality or (true) 
immortality. 
 
 
2 
 
References: 
Agar, N. (2010). Humanity's End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement. MIT 
University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
Agar, N. (2013). Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits. MIT 
University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
de Grey, A., & Rae, M. (2007). Ending Aging: The Rejuvenation Breakthroughs that Could 
Reverse Human Aging in Our Lifetime. St. Martin's Press: London. 
Glannon, W. (2002). Extending the Human Life Span. Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy, 27(3): 339-354. 
Juengst, E. T. et al. (2003). Biogerontology, “Anti‐aging Medicine,” and the Challenges of 
Human Enhancement. Hastings Center Report, 33(4): 21-30. 
Lucke, J. C., & Hall, W. (2006). Strong and Weak Lifespan Extension: What Is Most 
Feasible and Likely? Australasian Journal on Ageing, 25(2): 58-62. 
Olshansky, S. J., & Bruce A. C. (2001). The Quest for Immortality. W. W. Norton & 
Company. New York. 
Overall, C. (2003). Aging, Death, and Human Longevity: A Philosophical Inquiry. 
University of California Press: Berkeley. 
Wareham, C. (2016). The Transhumanist Prospect: Developing Technology to Extend the 
Human Lifespan. In Scarre G, (ed). The Palgrave Handbook of the Philosophy of Aging (pp. 
517-538). Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
 
